

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

NOTICE: This document is a working paper, not an official CIA issuance. It has been co-ordinated within ORE, but not with the IAC Agencies. It represents current thinking by specialists in CIA, and is designed for use by others engaged in similar or overlapping studies. The opinions expressed herein may be revised before final and official publication. It is intended solely for the information of the addressee and not for further dissemination.

Copy for: *[Signature]*

~~DOCUMENT NO. 6
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 14 NOV 79 REVIEWER: 000514~~

~~SECRET~~

NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH


INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Vol. IV No. 31

For Week Ending
10 August 1949

GENERAL

25X6A



GREECE

Severe test for guerrilla strategy: As the Greeks develop their major offensive against the guerrillas' key positions on the Greek-Albanian border, guerrilla strategy will get its most severe test to date. Previously, the guerrillas would have been ready to withdraw across the border when threatened with crippling losses in one locality (as in the Grammos fighting in the summer of 1948), only to resume their activities with equal intensity elsewhere in the 600-mile northern frontier zone. Now such a solution is not feasible: Albania is the only place from which sizable guerrilla units could operate, and the Greek Army can now begin to concentrate considerable effort on controlling the Albanian frontier so long as only relatively light forces are needed on the Yugoslav and Bulgarian frontiers and elsewhere in Greece. Meanwhile the guerrillas are on the defensive, having lost much of their mobility and at least some of their confidence with the drop in manpower and the restriction in their activities. They also feel the positive inconvenience of Tito's border controls and some uncertainty

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
2.

over immediate Communist objectives in the Macedonian area. When the full pressure of the Greek summer offensive is felt, guerrilla strategists will have to decide whether to go on defending or to order the evacuation of the key border areas. This is a decision which they would like to put off as long as possible, certainly until the September opening of the next UNGA session. An earlier withdrawal from the key areas would not only deal a hard blow to guerrilla prestige before new propaganda "peace" efforts could be staged but would also very seriously reduce guerrilla military capabilities.

TURKEY

Greek Orthodox patriarch likely to avoid risk of schism: Reports that Athenagoras, Ecumenical Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church, may openly cooperate with the Roman Catholic Church in its policy of excommunicating Communists are probably false. The risk of bringing about a serious schism with members of the Orthodox Church behind the iron curtain would be very great. That such an eventuality might occur if the Phanar were to adopt anything like the Vatican's trenchantly active policy has been emphasized by statements which Patriarch Alexei of Moscow has reportedly made. Alexei, it appears, claims that there need be no conflict between loyalty to the church and to the USSR, a Communist state. If Patriarch Athenagoras were now to adopt a militantly anti-Communist attitude, he might force upon Alexei another of the historic schisms in the Orthodox Church. One of the effects of such a rupture would be the decimation of the Phanar's actual and potential spiritual jurisdiction. The new Patriarch is most unlikely to risk that.

25X6A



~~SECRET~~

25X6A

~~SECRET~~

ITALIAN COLONIES

Eritrean independence movement: It appears that Eritrea, as well as Libya, may be a trouble spot during the September session of the General Assembly in view of the fact that all Eritrean political parties (except the "Union with Ethiopia" party) have formed an Independence Coalition. Although their individual platforms differ, the parties are united in their demands for immediate independence and for the rejection of any plan to partition Eritrea. Formation of the coalition may have been inspired by the defeat of the Bevin-Sforza Plan (which would have given Italy trusteeship over Tripolitania and Italian Somaliland) in the last GA session and by the fact that the UK recently granted nominal independence to the Cyrenaicans. It is estimated that the new Independence bloc represents the sentiment of at least two thirds of the population. Although the US is committed to back partition and the annexation of a part of Eritrea by Ethiopia, the chances for GA adoption of such a plan appear to be getting slimmer.

IRAN

Officials highly critical of US support: Iran's leaders have become increasingly impatient over their failure to obtain the military and economic assistance requested of the US during recent months. High personalities, including the Shah, the Chief of Staff, and the Manager of the National Bank, have bitterly reproached the US, intimating that Iran would be compelled to seek assistance in other quarters if US aid were not forthcoming. The recent statement to the press made by Iran's Prime Minister (7 August) is the latest indication of the measure of dissatisfaction and may reflect a feeling among Iranians that US interest in Iran is waning.

Although these efforts to obtain US aid may be motivated in part by a desire to get something for nothing, they are also inspired by the feeling among Iranians that Iran should receive aid comparable to that given Turkey. In Iranian eyes, Iran is strategically as important as Turkey,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4.

made greater contributions to the Allies during the war, and since the war has successfully resisted stronger Soviet pressures despite its greater vulnerability.

The preoccupation of high Iranian officials with the question of US aid has tended to slow down implementation of the Seven Year Plan and to delay the solution of pressing food problems. Moreover, the requests have on the whole been ill conceived, poorly coordinated, and exaggerated, indicating confused thinking and unrealistic planning. The technical and legal difficulties involved have been explained to the Iranian Government, but the Iranians appear to think that these obstacles would no more stand in the way of granting aid to Iran than to Turkey unless the US so willed it. Thus the cumulative effect of continued disappointments may result in a loosening of US-Iranian ties and in Iran's turning more and more to Western European countries for guidance and assistance.

Preventive action in Azerbaijan: The closing by Iranian police of foreign propaganda outlets in Tabriz emphasizes the potentially serious nature of conditions in Azerbaijan. The action was allegedly directed against the Soviets, though the British likewise were affected. This preventive action by the police, which involved the closing of the VOKS building and the Soviet Bookshop, may be justified in view of reports that pro-Soviet sympathies are developing in the Kurdish areas and among the Assyrian Christians. It appears incontestable that economic conditions are worsening in Azerbaijan and that both substantial imports of food and considerable public works projects will be necessary if hunger and unemployment are to be relieved and the loyalty of the population to the Central Government is to be maintained. Unless such concrete steps are taken, the mere absence of Soviet propaganda agencies will not check a serious rise in popular discontent.

PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN

The tribal areas problem: Afghan officials are being recalled to Kabul, apparently for a top-level conference to discuss the Afghan-Pakistan tribal areas problem. Ambassador Najibullah has departed suddenly from Delhi for Kabul, and Faiz Mohammed, the GOA Ambassador to the UK, is likewise returning to Kabul. In the light of recent conversations between Faiz Mohammed and Foreign Secretary Bevin, it appears that the Afghan attitude toward the tribal areas along the Pakistani border is based on the contention that: (1) before partition, both the UK and Afghanistan recognized the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
5.

independence of the tribal areas; (2) in any event, the GOA does not recognize that the GOP has succeeded to the UK position in the area; and (3) the tribal areas, once part of Afghanistan, had been given up under duress. Faiz Mohammed also said that the GOA is considering denouncing the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921, and press reports state that the Afghan National Assembly has passed a resolution to repudiate the treaty. Therefore, the forthcoming meeting in Kabul may portend a worsening of relations between the GOA and GOP. In the event that bilateral agreement between the two nations proves impossible, they may be advised to refer the dispute to an international tribunal for settlement.

NOTED IN BRIEF

Whistling in the dark would not raise Greek guerrilla morale any more than will the recent mild order for an "anniversary" celebration of the guerrilla army on 28 October. The rank and file have already been told that they must hold on to Vitsi and Grammos at all costs--at least until the September meeting of the UNGA, and mere talk about more distant "anniversaries" may seem highly impractical to them during the intervening critical campaign. The suspicion may also spread among both guerrillas and Greek fellow-travelers that the Greek Communist high command has run out of original ideas: the day appropriated is in reality one of Greece's two greatest national holidays, the "No" Day on which Greece in 1940 flatly turned down Mussolini's invasion ultimatum.

* * *

The acceptance of Turkey as a member of the Council of Europe will be greeted with very great pleasure in Turkey. The Turks are politically, economically, and militarily closely linked with the Western democracies. Thus, despite sour comments that membership in this currently weak organization is a poor substitute for inclusion in the more immediately potent North Atlantic Pact, the Turks generally will be greatly heartened by the inclusion in the European Council of delegates from a country whose territory is 97 percent Asiatic. Indeed, the sight of Ottoman Turks sitting around the Council tables at Strassburg may fruitfully stir the imagination of some of Turkey's Asiatic neighbors.

* * *

To prevent further damage to the Turkish economy by the pernicious practice of "compensation" trade (see NE/A Weekly Summary of 3 August 1949), Turkey will doubtless try to revise trade agreements

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6.

when possible. It is not to be supposed, however, that the Turkish Government will be willing to obey the letter of its own laws unless some less damaging method of selling Turkish products abroad can be devised. None that can be speedily effective has yet been proposed.

*

*

*

Recurrent attacks upon the integrity and fidelity of Iranian Chief of Staff Razmara by disgruntled politicians, jealous colleagues, and palace factotums have started a new spate of rumors that General Razmara is seeking to set himself up as dictator. The most serious charge against Razmara, that he intends to displace the Shah, has no evidence to support it. Although he may harbor ambitions to be the strong man of Iran and although the recent retirement of some senior officers may have been due to his machinations, the elimination of most of these officers as well as the incorporation of the bulk of the gendarmerie into the army, a move which had the Shah's support, were probably undertaken primarily to improve the effectiveness of the military establishment.

~~SECRET~~